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Abstract: Drawing  on  the  literatures  on  elite  transitions,  factionalism  and  the  new
institutionalism, this paper hypothesizes that the stability of partially democratic and emerging
democratic regimes is dependent on the willingness of elites to make credible commitments to
cooperate and comply with democratic rules. That willingness (or lack thereof) can be signaled
by the presence of cooperative or conflict-precipitating events and actions in the periods around
elections.  We identify and analyze a variety of intra-elite interactions and demonstrate that
conflict-precipitating  events  significantly  increase  the  odds  of  a  democratic  retreat  in  the
months before or just after an election, while cooperative events can balance them and prevent
retreat. Using event data collected from 40 low- and middle-income countries  for two-year
periods around national  elections between 1991 and 2007 we show that  the imbalance of
conflict-precipitating over cooperative events is far greater in cases of retreat from democracy.
Furthermore,  international  intervention  and  pressure  had  a  negative  relationship  with
democratic stability. A logistic regression model accurately identified democratic retreat in 79
percent of the cases examined. Factor analysis revealed several common patterns of intra-elite
conflict that can lead to democratic retreat, or conversely, patterns of cooperative events that
bolster democratic consolidation. Finally, the data strongly argues for a model of democratic
development that depends on open-ended elite maneuvering and the emergence of elite agree-
ments, rather than a model where strong prior institutional constraints determine elite actions.
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1. Introduction
Progress  toward  democracy  is  usually  considered
desirable—except  for  the  problem  that  partial  and
emerging  democracies  have  long  been  flagged  as
particularly  vulnerable  to  violence or  collapse [1,2].
Elections are a particularly risky and uncertain time for
emerging  democracies,  as  they can lead to  greater
consolidation, or to the outbreak of violence against
the government or to government repression of the
opposition. This leaves political analysts with a puzzle
—how to identify when partial and emerging demo-
cracies are making progress toward stable consolida-
tion, and when are there signs that such regimes are
heading toward turmoil?
This study explores whether any specific pattern of
events surrounding elections in partial and emerging
democracies forms a reliable indicator of the eventual
fate of these regimes. In particular, we examine the
role of intra-elite interactions as signals of underlying
patterns  of  relationships  that  may  prevent  or
precipitate violence or further retreat from democracy.
The elite  groups examined include the  ruling  party,
the dominant opposition and the military. This paper
classifies various types of elite actions and events that
indicate  the  presence  or  absence  of  formal  and
informal intra-elite cooperation and conflict, and then
examines  whether  such  events  have  a  statistically
significant  relation  to  the continued stability,  or  the
retreat from, democratic rule.
Democratic  transitions  have  often been identified
as  arising  from  the  development  of  cooperative
arrangements or pacts among elites [3-5]. Numerous
studies  have  explored  the  roots  and  dynamics  of
political instability in partially democratic regimes [1-
11]. These studies have identified divisions among the
elites as both a catalyst for democracy as well as a
major  cause  of  democratic  retreats.  However,  this
literature  is  lacking  in  three  ways.  First,  it  has  not
clearly specified the types of elite actions that lead to
either regime collapse or stability.  Instead, much of
the focus is on the forging of agreements or pacts [3-
5] or on elite adoption of specific institutions [12-14].
Except  in  hindsight,  there  is  no way to  tell  if  such
agreements  will  hold  or  if  compliance  with  the
formally adopted institutions will  last.  Second, much
of the study of elite factionalism and political conflict
is undertaken in single-country case studies, providing
a rich understanding of a country's conflict trajectory,
but leaving unanswered the question of whether the
same  elite  actions  that  contribute  to  democratic
retreat or sustainability in one country would apply to
other national contexts [15-17]. Finally, the literature
on political conflict tells us much less about how to
observe acts  of  elite  cooperation than elite  conflict,
despite  a  growing  recognition  of  the  former's
importance in maintaining regime stability [3,18].
This research adds to our understanding of regime
stability  by  improving  our  ability  to  identify  and
differentiate  between  cooperative  and  conflict-
precipitating patterns of elite actions. A second aim is
to enhance the effectiveness of intervention strategies
in  emerging  democracies  by  accurately  predicting
instances when elections are likely to lead to further
consolidation of, or retreat from, democratic governance.
2. Theoretical Background
To identify  candidate events  and actions  that  could
indicate progress toward consolidation or democratic
retreat,  this  study  draws  on  insights  from  the
literatures  on  elite  theory,  structural  theories,
factionalism and the new institutionalism. Elite theory
as laid out by classical theorists like Pareto, Mosca and
Michels focuses on the pre-eminence of a small and
organized  minority  in  key  governance  and  non-
governance  positions,  determining  the  fates  of  the
larger unorganized minority.  The elites in this paper
for  the most  part  are those whom Mosca  calls  the
"political classes". These elites are an inherent feature
of almost all societies and systems, whether they are
effective  regimes,  dysfunctional  democracies,  or
primitive autocracies. Elite theory sees the interactions
among elites—whether cooperative or conflictual—as
the  essential  determinant  of  whether  institutional
arrangements will prove stable or not [3].
The  structuralist  school  of  thought  regarding
democratic transitions stresses that elites are bound
by context; that is, democratic transitions come about
as  a  result  of  changing  economic  structures  that
create  divisions  within  the  old  dominant  elites  that
lead  to  regime  collapse  [19,20].  Transitions  to
democracies occur when new elite alignments arise in
which  elites  cooperate  in  maintaining  the  rules  of
democratic competition. Structuralists also emphasize
that powerful nations wield significant influence over
elite  dynamics  and  democratic  transitions  in  less
powerful states [19,21].
The literature on factionalism argues that countries
with  high  levels  of  factionalism  have  high  risks  of
regime  instability  and  violent  conflict.  Factionalism
reflects  the  presence  of  parochialism  (a  focus  on
group  interests  rather  than  national  issues  and
interests),  polarization (intense conflict  in  a  winner-
take-all,  hostile  environment),  and  violent  factional
mobilization [22,23]. Scholars of factionalism believe
that international intervention is often the only way to
change or influence elites' political actions. As Keefer
and  Knack  [24]  note,  "in  situations  where  political
systems  are  highly  polarized…a  political  stalemate
between the two groups develops and, unless a force
emerges that encourages cooperation [the stalemate]
will prevent the development of coherent policy until
one  group  emerges  victorious  or  until  the  divisions
shake the polity apart".
From  the  new  institutionalism  perspective  (e.g.,
[25]), the concept of credible commitments forms the
lever that either reduces or strengthens factionalism.
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Credible  commitments  are  formal  and  informal
interactions  among political  competitors  that  ensure
that factional interests are protected, that parochial-
ism is overcome by compromise, and that polarization
is avoided. Positive interactions entail the perception
of  fair  treatment  and  a  mutual  commitment  to
resolving  issues  through  established  channels,  irre-
spective  of  which  group  holds  official  power.
Compensation to elite ruling coalitions for withholding
coercion and allowing stability to exist within the state
comes  in  the  form of  political  and economic  rents,
which  are  shared  among  the  members  of  the
coalition.  The  status  quo  is  threatened  when  new
groups demand a share in the rents and a role in the
ruling coalition. North, Wallis and Weingast argue that
the government's failure to make or keep its credible
commitments  to  maintain  stability  and sharing  eco-
nomic  and  political  rents  increases  the  odds  of  a
regime collapse. Other institutionalist approaches sim-
ilarly argue that long-established patterns of cooperat-
ive  behavior  rooted  in  colonial  or  legal  traditions
reflect  agreements and pay-offs  that  promote intra-
elite  cooperation  and  thus  maintain  democratic
institutions [12,13,26,27]. Goldstone and Ulfelder [18]
argued that "the key to maintaining stability appears
to lie in the development of institutions that promote
fair and open competition, avoid political polarization
and factionalism, and impose substantial  constraints
on executive authority".
All of these theoretical perspectives argue for the
importance of  elite  actions—whether shifts  in  align-
ments, agreements, commitments, or polarization and
conflict—in shaping the progress toward democracy.
Yet all also tend to take a long-term view of change,
showing how differences emerge across decades or
even centuries. This is of little help in identifying, as
an  emerging  democratic  state  approaches  its  early
national  elections,  whether  any  newly  forged  elite
agreements  or  newly  adopted  institutions  will  hold.
Certainly some countries that were not blessed with a
long  history  of  favorable  institutions  have  made
successful  transitions to  stable  democracy,  including
Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal  in  Europe,  Brazil  and
Colombia in Latin America, South Korea and Indonesia
in  Asia,  to  name  just  a  few.  Yet  other  countries
appeared  to  have  adopted  sound  democratic
institutions, but failed to sustain them and went into
democratic  retreat,  such  as  Chile  in  the  1970s,  or
Nigeria several times reverting to military rule, as just
two  examples.  Our  goal  in  this  paper  is  primarily
empirical;  we  ask:  among  low-income  emerging
democracies,  does  the  evidence  regarding  elite
interactions  around  national  elections  reveal  any
particular patterns, or are there any specific cooperat-
ive or conflictual events or actions, that are significant
predictors of later stability or retreat?
Yet  our  analysis  also  lets  us  address  theoretical
issues.  If  the  new  institutionalists  are  correct,  and
democratic progress rests on strong institutions 'tying
the hands' of elites to prevent conflictual actions, then
in the period around elections in countries moving to
stable democracy we should see very few conflictual
actions  and  almost  entirely  cooperative  events  and
actions, as the institutions shape behavior. Countries
lacking  strong  institutions  to  bind  elites  would
conversely show mainly conflictual behavior, as elites
maneuver  to  grab  power  and  elections  are  just
another occasion for power struggles. By contrast, if
the theorists  of  democracy as emerging from hard-
won  elite  bargains  and  evolving  agreements  are
correct, so that elites retain great autonomy and have
to decide whether or not to cooperate in upholding
democratic  institutions,  we  expect  that  the  period
around elections in emerging democracy would show
a combination of conflictual and cooperative events,
with the balance shifting somewhat toward coopera-
tion  where  stable  democracy  develops,  but  shifting
toward  conflict  where  democracy  breaks  down.  We
can thus shed light on the institutional constraints vs.
elite  bargaining  paradigms  by  asking:  are  different
outcomes associated with clear patterns of predomin-
antly conflictual or cooperative behavior?
We also can address the structuralists' claims about
the importance of international intervention—when we
add  international  efforts  to  reinforce  democratic
behavior to the mix of elite interactions and events,
how significantly  do  such  efforts  shift  the  odds  for
stable democracy in the near future?
Thus this paper asks three empirical questions: Do
any specific elite actions or events observed around
national  elections  in  low-and  middle-income  states
show a significant tendency to portend future demo-
cratic stability or retreat? Does the mix of cooperat-
ive  and  conflictual  events  observed  around  such
elections  indicate  strong  effects  of  institutions
creating predominantly cooperative or predominantly
conflictual settings, or does the mix reflect more fluid
and closely balanced settings in which elites appear
to  be  moving  back  and  forth  toward  settlements?
Does  international  intervention  around  national
elections make a significant difference in promoting
stable outcomes?
3. Data and Methods
These questions were addressed by developing typo-
logies  of  conflict-precipitating  and  cooperative
events, and counting the various types of events that
occurred in 40  partial  democracies  in  the eighteen
months  before  and  six  months  following  national
elections for  either  national  legislatures or  national
executives  between  1991  and  2007.  The  partial
democracies  were  selected,  as  described  in  more
detail below, to include counties that both sustained
democracy for  years  after  their  elections,  and
countries  that  failed  to  do  so.  The  countries  and




From a review of the literature on democratic trans-
itions,  factionalism and the new institutionalism, we
identified  23  discrete  types  of  events  and  actions
involving elites. We began with 11 "conflict-precipitat-
ing" and 12 "cooperative" events/actions. A "conflict-
precipitating" event or action is described as one that
initiates  or  heightens  hostility,  conflict  and  tensions
between opposing parties and reduces the scope for
mutual trust and cooperation. A "cooperative" event
or action brings parties previously hostile, in conflict
or not cooperating to a greater level of mutual trust
and cooperation.
We  do  not  distinguish  between  "actions"  and
"events", as the events we are observing are usually
just  the  outcomes  of  prior  elite  actions.  Some
observers  might  treat  a  boycott  of  elections  as  an
event; others as an action. The arrest of an opposition
leader is an event, but it is also an action by the ruling
elites. Our goal was to identify events or actions that
could be given a specific date and place and identified
from  news  accounts  regarding  a  country  in  the
months  leading  up  to  and  following  a  national
election. Thus, every time a riot is reported, a conflict
event  is  recorded;  we divide these  events  into  two
categories—those that draw little or no response from
the government, and those that draw a strong military
response from the government. A full description of all
identified cooperative and conflict-precipitating events
and actions is given in Appendix 2 [28].
Information on the occurrence of cooperative and
precipitating events and actions was obtained from an
examination  of  local  and  international  print  media
over  a  two-year  period  for  each  country  revolving
around  a  potentially  contentious  upcoming  national
election.  The time period stretches from 18 months
prior  to  the  election  to  six  months  following  the
election.  Elections  present  a  critical  opportunity  for
change in the political system. It  is  around election
time that the opposition is most vocal and looking to
strengthen its support base, while the ruling party is
reactive  and  attempting  to  maintain  its  supremacy.
Interactions in the months leading up to an election,
or in the months immediately following, when results
may be contested, offer ample opportunity  for both
government and opposition leaders to signal whether
they intend to cooperate with opponents or not.
We  found  that,  as  the  time  before  or  after  the
election date increased, fewer elite actions or events
occurred.  Once  the  data  had  been  coded,  we
discovered that within the 18-month period prior to an
election, an average of 7.003 months passed before
the first  event  was coded.  Furthermore,  in  the six-
month period following the election, we found that an
average  of  4.55  months  passed  between  the  last
coded  event  following  the  election  month,  and  the
end of the six month period. What this shows clearly
is that the vast majority of identified elite actions and
events  took  place  within  the  period  from one year
before to two months after the election. The further
one stretches the time frame, the steeper the drop off
in the observed cooperative and conflictual events.
Two coders populated the dataset, checking for the
presence of any of the identified events in a month-
by-month  examination  of  media  accounts  of  state
politics.  A sample of  results  was replicated by each
coder to ensure inter-rater reliability of the coders.
Those events that did not occur at all in the groups
of  countries  analyzed,  or  were  observed  in  only  a
handful  of  instances,  were  omitted  from the list  of
variables. For cooperative events, the resulting refined
list included seven (out of the original twelve) cooper-
ative events. Five were internal events: Bringing the
opposition into the government (BringOpp),  conces-
sion or agreement by government leaders to accept or
act on opposition demands (ActOnOpp), a big win by
either the regime or the opposition in a free and fair
election (BigWin), explicit negotiations between gov-
ernment  and opposition  leaders  to  resolve  disputes
(ExplNeg), and agreement of a regime leader to step
down prior to the scheduled election, usually to clear
the way for another candidate (StepDown). Two types
of international interventions were observed: interna-
tional intervention to promote free and fair elections
(Interv)  and international  pressure  for  reconciliation
and fair play (IntPres). All of these events could be
seen as changing the calculus of political actors in the
direction of democratic stability. BringOpp, ActOnOpp,
ExplNeg, and StepDown all indicate that ruling groups
are  willing  to  make  a  constructive,  compromising
response  to  demands  of  the  opposition.  BigWin,
Interv,  and  IntPress  all  indicate  to  both  ruling  and
opposition  groups  that  either  the  electorate  or  the
international  community  is  strongly  committed  to
backing fair and cooperative conduct.
A similar refinement was undertaken with conflict-
precipitating events, as we set aside those that were
not or only rarely observed in the cases investigated.
The resulting six (out of the original eleven) events
were: No action by the government in response to op-
position protests (NoAction), extremely harsh military
actions against a guerrilla rebellion, opposition group
or protestors (MilExt), political acts by the opposition
to undermine the elections or the ruling regime, such
as boycotts, assassinations or refusal to accept elec-
tion  results  (OppActs),  constitutional  struggles  in
which groups contest key rules of the game, challen-
ging or seeking to change the constitution (ConstStr),
coercive acts by the regime to undermine or hinder
the opposition from fairly contesting an election, such
as arresting or assassinating opposition politicians or
banning an opposition party (ContrlOpp), and guerrilla
or terrorist acts by the opposition (VioActs).
3.2. Dependent Variables
We started with a group of 14 cases identified in the
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Political Instability Task Force Problem Set [29] that
experienced a major democratic retreat or instability
within a year of scheduled elections (before or after)
between 1991 and 2007. These constituted our cases
of democratic retreat centered on elections. In each of
these cases, there occurred a retreat from democracy,
defined as any of the following conditions being met:
There  is  a  successful  coup,  the  regime  indefinitely
postpones  or  cancels  an  election,  or  the  regime
outlaws the opposition or disqualifies it from particip-
ating in an upcoming election.
We began with 1991, because the period following
the end of the Cold War created a new world, reflect-
ing rapid changes in global power as well as regimes.
Focusing on the post-Cold War era gave us a more
consistent time frame in which to test relationships.
We ended with elections no later than 2007, because
we wanted to be able to check our work for longer
event horizons—up to two years beyond the elections,
and  when  we  began  this  research  in  late  2010,
complete  data  was  only  available  through  2009.
However, as we noted above, stretching out the time
frame provided few or no important additional events
—all the 'action' appears to take place in the months
immediately before and after the scheduled elections.
The  chosen  period  of  1991–2007  also  offered
reasonably  complete  and  accessible  information  on
political  events  from  on-line  references  such  as
Keesing's World News Archive and LexisNexis, and a
manageable number of cases for coding.
We then selected a random sample of 26 countries
(roughly twice as many as the problem cases, since
the  former  are  relatively  rare)  from those  low and
middle-income countries (GNI/capita under $10,000 in
constant  2000  U.S.  Dollars)  that  held  national
elections  between  1991  and  2007,  and  did  not
experience a democratic retreat within the two years
following their election. We restricted ourselves to low
and middle-income countries because of Przeworski et
al.'s [6] finding that high income democracies do not
retreat from democracy; we wanted comparison cases
in  which  such  a  retreat  was  possible,  but  did  not
occur.  In  three  of  these  countries,  two  national
elections were held during this period; we thus ended
up with 29 cases of elections that did not lead to a
democratic retreat.
In this paper we refer to the 14 country cases in
which a retreat  from democracy occurred around a
scheduled election (either in the twelve months before
or after) as the "retreat" cases. The "no retreat" cases
consist of 29 elections in 26 countries, in which no
such retreat occurred in a similar twenty-four month
period bracketing the election.
The countries we examined had Polity IV regime
scores that varied widely, ranging from –7 to +10 on
the Polity IV scale during the period of analysis. Figure
1 shows the trajectories of the average Polity scores
for the retreat and no retreat cases over a four year
period: two years before,  the year of,  and the first
year after the observed elections.
As can be seen from the graph, for both sets of
countries—the  retreat  and  no  retreat  cases—the
average Polity score over the observed period was 2.6.
In  other  words,  most  of  the  countries  were  indeed
emerging democracies, with Polity scores barely above
the  zero  point  separating  democracies  from
dictatorships. However, while the no retreat countries
started, on average, with a negative polity score, they
ended with a positive score. By contrast, the retreat
countries started with an average polity score of +4,
but declined by nearly seven steps over the four years
we observed them to an average score of –2.71.
In some of the democratic retreat cases, such as
Armenia  and  Thailand,  there  were  very  dramatic
declines in the Polity scores from high positive values
(7  and  9)  to  large  negative  values  (–5  and  –6).
Moreover, violence often flared or intensified—in six of
the  fourteen cases of  democratic  retreat,  civil  wars
were started, resumed, or intensified in response to
the calling or miscarriage of elections.
Figure 1: Polity movement across all cases.
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For most no retreat cases, the difference between
the Polity scores for countries at the beginning and
end of their analysis period was either zero or a small
positive gain, indicating that there was a continuation
of the status quo rather than significant progress. In
many  cases,  the  prevailing  situation  was  far  from
ideal. Some no retreat countries—Mauritania, Djibouti,
Guinea,  Chad  and  Tunisia—had  scores  that  were
consistently negative, ranging from –7 to –2. These
regimes may have been only partially democratic, but
even in unpromising circumstances they were able to
hold elections with some opposition participation and
experienced  no  marked  retreat  from  democratic
processes or collapse of government institutions.
4. Analysis and Results
For our initial analysis, we explored the relationship of
the individual cooperative and precipitating events to
the  retreat  and  no  retreat  outcomes  using  Chi-
squared  tests.  We  found  five  of  the  six  common
conflict-precipitating  events  to  have  a  statistically
significant positive association with democratic retreat
at  the  10%  level:  NoAction,  ConstStr,  ContrlOpp,
OppActs,  and  VioActs.  (ContrlOpp,  OppActs  and
VioActs were also significant at the 5% level.) These
events  therefore  act  as  indicators  of  a  coming
democratic  failure,  presumably by  showing  that  the
ruling  coalition  and/or  the  opposition  will  not  work
with each other in ways that respect legal processes
and promote stability.
We  found  that  only  two  cooperative  events,
AcceptDef  and IntPres,  had a statistically  significant
relationship with democratic retreat at the 10% level.
Interestingly, the effect of IntPres was negative, as it
was observed more frequently in cases of democratic
retreat. Indeed, we found to our surprise that several
of the cooperative variables occurred more frequently
in the retreat cases than in the no retreat cases. 
As  we demonstrate  below,  this  was  because  the
cases of democratic retreat had both a higher level of
cooperative  events  and  a  much  higher  level  of
conflictual  events.  It  appears  that  cases  with  high
levels  of  conflict  also  elicited  a  large  number  of
cooperative  actions  as  efforts  to  respond  to  the
conflict. This higher volume of cooperative events in
cases of democratic retreat meant that several of the
cooperative  events  and  actions  showed  an
unexpected, positive relationship to democratic retreat
when examined individually.
It  is  therefore  necessary  to  examine  the  joint
effects  of  the two kinds of  events  and actions and
their  relationship  to  democratic  outcomes.  Figure  2
presents these findings, showing the average number
of conflict precipitating events, the average number of
cooperative events, and the difference between them
for  both  the  democratic  retreat  and  the  no  retreat
cases.
It is quite striking to see how much the difference
between the number of precipitating and cooperative
events  differs  in  the  two  groups  of  countries.  In
countries where a retreat from democracy occurred,
we observed on average 2.6 more precipitating events
than cooperative events;  where no retreat  occurred
the  difference  went  in  the  other  direction,  with  on
average  0.3  fewer precipitating  than  cooperative
events.  The  magnitude  of  the  difference  between
conflict  and  cooperation  appears  to  be  crucial  in
whether democratic retreat occurs.
This difference is driven mainly by the incidence of
conflict-precipitating events and actions. There was a
significantly  higher  average  number  of  conflict-
precipitating  events  in  countries  with  democratic
retreat (7.7 vs. 3.1). There were more modest differ-
ences in the average number of  cooperative events
(5.1 vs. 3.4). Still, there was a higher prevalence of
cooperative  events  in  countries  where  there  was  a
democratic  retreat.  At  first  glance,  this  may  seem
counterintuitive.  However,  it  demonstrates  that  in
countries  sliding  toward  political  crisis,  there  are
usually attempts to reverse the slide through cooper-
ative acts. The fact that cooperative events were fairly
similar  in  incidence  in  both  retreat  and  no  retreat
cases accounts for the finding that most cooperative
events  were  not  statistically  significantly  associated
with  no  retreat  outcomes,  and  that  several  in  fact
were more commonly found in the no retreat cases.
Thus the answer to our first question is that there
are observable  differences  in  the  frequencies  of
conflictual and cooperative events that can distinguish
between  the  cases  where  democracy  suffered  a
retreat and those where it did not.  In particular, it is
difference  between the  level  of  conflictual  and
cooperative events and actions that appears crucial.
Figure  2: Frequency  distribution  of  conflict-
precipitating and cooperative events.
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It is where conflict-precipitating events occur consid-
erably more often than cooperative events and actions
that  democracy  will  likely  fail.  On  the  other  hand,
where  cooperative  events  balance  closely  or  even
slightly outweigh conflict-precipitating events, democracy
is  unlikely  to  retreat.  Perhaps  our  most  interesting
finding is that it is not necessary for cooperative events
to dominate, nor for conflict to be wholly absent, for
democracy to prevail and continue. All that is neces-
sary is for cooperative actions and events to fully bal-
ance conflictual events, and to avoid a strong imbal-
ance in elite interactions and events in favor of conflict.
We go further to identify the most important such
events and actions, and develop a regression model of
their effects, in the following section.
In  regard  to  our  second  question,  the  evidence
clearly  favors the theory of democracy as emerging
from elites freely bargaining and maneuvering toward
agreements,  rather  than  being  bound  or  strongly
guided by prior institutional arrangements. In the no
retreat  cases,  the  numbers  of  cooperative  and
precipitating  events  were  very  nearly  even,  with
cooperative  events  only  slightly  dominating.  We
therefore find no evidence that during these periods
around  national  elections,  prior  existing  institutions
strongly  restrained  elites  from  conflictual  actions.
Rather,  it  appears that  in a rough balance between
cooperative and non-cooperative actions and events,
the cooperative actions and events only slightly won
out. Similarly, the retreat cases do not show a wholly
unrestrained  conflictual  pattern  of  elite  interactions.
Rather, these cases show quite significant efforts by
elites  to  work  toward  cooperation,  with  even  more
cooperative actions or events than in the no retreat
cases (average 5.1 vs. 3.4 per case), that were in the
end  overwhelmed  by  even  greater  numbers  of
conflictual actions and events. It thus appears than an
institutional  theory of  democratic  success vs. failure
does not fit our data, at least for the very short-term
framework being investigated here (outcomes up to
one year beyond the election). Rather, it seems that
elites were constantly choosing and shifting between
conflictual  and  cooperative  approaches,  and  that
stable resolutions reflected a very narrow triumph of
cooperative choices. 
The  cases  of  Thailand,  Bulgaria,  and  Estonia
illustrate  how  the  frequency  of,  and  gap  between,
conflict-precipitating and cooperative events can affect
regime  stability.  Thailand  is  an  extreme  case  of
cooperation and conflict. There were 16 total events
of cooperation and conflict during the two-year period
under study (October 2004–2006, bracketing the April
2006 election). Of these, four were cooperative events
and  12  were  conflict-precipitating  events.  In  early
2005, then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai
Rak Thai (TRT) Party won a major victory at the polls.
The Democrat  Party  conceded defeat,  sacking their
party leader. Yet instead of working within the political
system,  with  this  new  mandate  Thaksin  began  to
consolidate power in the executive, and attempted to
silence  the  media  through  the  courts  and  through
purchases  of  media  outlets.  Thaksin's  cabinet
approved a special  decree—"The Emergency Powers
Act"—that gave Thaksin sweeping powers to deal with
Muslim separatists in Southern Thailand. His adminis-
tration also put on trial individuals who criticized the
government.
The opposition Democrats and their allies reacted
strongly to these actions, pressuring the government
through  means  outside  of  the  system  of  political
cooperation, such as bomb plots and street protests,
to  give  up  its  attempts  to  consolidate  power  and
control the media. There were few attempts at elite
cooperation.  One  came  during  the  height  of  anti-
government protest marches when Thaksin signaled
that he would step down and not run again if protest
leaders  agreed  to  end  street  protests.  This  act  of
cooperation was isolated and was not followed up by
other  signals  of  cooperation  and  compromise.  A
distrusting Democrat Party boycotted the 2 April 2006
election, resulting in the TRT being able to grab most
of  the  seats  in  the  parliament.  With  an  absolute
majority in the parliament, Thaksin took on the power
of the military, seeking to undermine senior officers.
But the military struck back—in October 2006 he was
ousted in a coup, thus producing a democratic retreat.
Bulgaria shows a different pattern. As a loss for the
ruling BSP party seemed imminent in the presidential
and  parliamentary  elections  scheduled  for  1997,
marked instances of conflict arose. However in light of
widespread public protests, the ruling party bowed to
pressure and refrained from forming a new cabinet
and instead allowed a caretaker government to take
over until the parliamentary elections were over. The
government eventually stepped down and allowed the
opposition  party  UDF  to  take  over  the  reins  of
government.  Thus,  the  country  was  able  to  avoid
retreat  due  to  a  prevalence  of  cooperative  events
which allowed for a smooth transition of power.
Estonia provides a case where retreat could have
happened,  given  that  the  legislature  passed  a  no-
confidence motion in 1994 against the reigning Prime
Minister Mart Laar, who was forced to step down and
allow  Andres  Tarand  to  take  over.  However,  the
country  surprisingly  saw  no  conflict-precipitating
events on the part of the ruling regime or the opposi-
tion. Instead the 1995 elections were allowed to take
place and the opposition party KMU won, eventually
forming a coalition government with the Centre Party.
While the frequency of cooperative and precipitat-
ing events and the gaps between them are important
factors  in  democratic  retreat,  there  may  also  be  a
pattern in how elite interactions unfold within a partic-
ular election period that may be important for under-
standing  regime  outcomes.  That  is,  do  cooperative
and conflictual  events  tend to cluster  together,  and
does one type tend to have a higher event density
than  the  other?  To  explore  this,  an  event  density
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score was calculated for each country to understand
what effect,  if  any,  event  clustering  had  on regime
stability  [30].  Figure  3  illustrates  the  results  of  the
examination of event clustering.
The  average  cluster  value  of  events  for  the
democratic  retreat  cases  was  0.81,  whereas  the
average cluster size for cases in which there was no
democratic  retreat  was  0.73.  So  in  both  cases,  all
events  tended  to  occur  in  clusters,  rather  than  as
isolated incidents.
In  distinguishing  between  retreat  and  no  retreat
cases, the cluster analysis follows the same pattern as
the  event  counts—it  is  the  difference between
precipitating and cooperative events that matters. The
cluster value for cooperative events is about the same
for both retreat and no retreat cases (0.69 vs. 0.67).
However,  in  the  cases  of  democratic  retreat  the
clustering  value  for  conflict-precipitating  events  is
higher  than  for  cooperative  events  (0.75  vs.  0.69),
while for the no retreat cases the clustering value for
precipitating  events  is  lower  than  for  cooperative
events  (0.54  vs.  0.67).  Thus  we  find  a  strong
preponderance of density of cooperative events over
precipitating  events  characterizes  the  no  retreat
cases; while a modest preponderance in the density of
precipitating events over  cooperative events  charac-
terizes the cases of democratic retreat. This means that
in either outcome, it is usually a series of events, rather
than one specific event or action, that tilts the outcome
and determines democratic retreat or stability.
Figure 3: Cluster value results.
4.1.  Specific  Variables  and  a  Democratic  Retreat
Model
The next stage in the analysis was to determine the
relative  impact  of  specific  events  and  actions  on
democratic  retreat  or  persistence.  We  did  this  by
conducting a multivariate logistic regression, pooling
all the cases and events [31]. The results showed four
events  were  statistically  significant.  These  were
BigWin,  ConstStr,  ContrlOpp,  and  VioActs.  The
regression model is  depicted in Table 1. The model
had a 0.5 R2 value.
Table 1: Four variable logistic model.





Note:  Entries  are  based  on  unstandardized
parameter  estimates  in  logistic  regression
equations  for  the  cases  in  our  sample.  Standard
errors  are  depicted  in  parentheses.  *  p  <  0.1;
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
The  odds  ratios  indicate  that  in  our  sample  an
incidence  of  event  BigWin  sharply  decreases  the
relative odds of a democratic retreat by approximately
94%. Evidently, a decisive victory in an election that is
considered  free  and  fair  gives  the  winning  party
sufficient  standing  to  deal  with  opponents  from  a
position  of  security.  It  may  also  deprive  opposition
elites of the strength to keep contesting the regime's
right to hold power. Conversely, the incidence of event
ContrlOpp increases the relative odds of a democratic
retreat  by  70%.  Thus,  regimes  that  are  willing  to
place significant new restrictions on opponents in the
run-up to  elections  are  well  on  their  way  to  a  full
retreat  from  democratic  government.  Another  way
that  governments  restrict  opponents  is  through
changes to the constitution. An incident of ConstStr
raises  the  relative  odds  of  democratic  reversal  by
230%,  more than twice as much as  an incident  of
ContrlOpp. The strongest effect is from an incident of
VioActs;  this  increases  the  relative  odds  of  a
democratic retreat by roughly 610%, more than twice
as much as constitutional struggles. Violence by the
opposition  (not  the  government,  which  is  MilExt)
either  in  the  run-up,  or  immediately  following,
national elections seems to give the ruling regime an
opportunity  to  suppress  the  opposition  and  retreat
from democracy in the name of security. It may also
be a signal that the opposition believes the regime is
not giving it a fair opportunity in the elections, and
therefore has to pursue its aims by direct attacks on
the government.
The  probability  of  a  democratic  retreat  was
predicted  for  each  of  the  countries  in  the  analysis
using  the  logistic  regression.  The  model  correctly
predicted  no  retreat  in  89.66%  of  the  cases  that
remained democratic and correctly predicted retreat in
78.57% of  the  cases  that  experienced a significant
retreat.
4.2. Patterns of Regime-Opposition Interactions
We  further  explored,  through  factor  analysis,  the
possibility  that  our  events  and  actions  fell  into
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patterns of cooperative and precipitating events. Such
composite  factors  might  characterize  common
trajectories that lead to democratic retreat or stability.
For  our  paper  we  use  principal  component  factor
analysis. From a factor rotation with up to 5 factors, a
possible  three-factor  solution  emerged.  This  three-
factor solution is outlined in Table 2 along with the
factor score coefficients for each of those variables.
The  factor  coefficients  indicate  that  each  factor  is
composed  of  roughly  equal  weighting  on  its
component variables.
New composite variables were created by combining
the variables in each factor. These were: Factor 1—
Violence,  Intervention  and  Negotiation;  Factor  2—
Elections  and  Policy;  and  Factor  3—Ruling  Party
Actions.  The  factor  score  method  was  used  (factor
scales are preferred for binary data). Individually the
variance for Factor 1 is 2.42, variance for Factor 2 is
2.22,  and  variance  for  Factor  3  is  2.16.  A  logistic
regression  was  conducted  using  the  factor  scores.
Table 3 illustrates the results of the regression. The
model had a 0.25 R2 value.
An increase in Factor 1:  Violence, Intervention
and  Negotiation  (VioActs,  IntPres  and  ExpNeg)
increased  the  relative  odds  of  democratic  retreat.
Factor 1 can be thought of as indicating a process in
which violent acts—usually a guerrilla war or acts of
terrorism—on  the  part  of  the  opposition  result  in
international  pressure,  which  then  brings  parties  to
the  negotiation  table.  However,  this  pattern  of
international  pressure  and  explicit  negotiation  in
conjunction  with  violent  opposition  actions  had  a
negative impact on democratic stability.
This pattern is exemplified by the politics of Congo-
Brazzaville  between  1996  and  1998.  In  July  1996,
armed  militias  loyal  to  former  President  and
opposition leader Denis Sassou-Nguesso occupied the
northeastern  town  of  Mossaka  to  prevent  the
installation of the new mayor Jean-Michel Bokamba-
Yangoma, a member of the presidential group, who
had defeated an opposition candidate close to Sassou-
Nguesso in  recent mayoral  elections.  Over  the next
year,  the  conflict  descended  into  Civil  War,  as  the
regime, led by democratically elected president Pascal
Lissouba, and the opposition engaged in large scale
tit-for-tat violence. In June of 1997, President Jacques
Chirac of France appealed personally to Lissouba and
Sassou-Nguesso  to  end  hostilities.  Both  factions
engaged in explicit negotiations, including ceasefires
and  UN  and  African  Union  sponsored  peace  talks.
These efforts ultimately failed when a coup took place
in  October  1997,  orchestrated  by  former  president
Sassou-Nguesso.
Yet this process of violence, international pressure
and  negotiation  is  just  one  possible  route  of  the
political process. 
Table 2: Three-factor solution.
Factor/Label Variable Coefficient
Factor 1
ExplNeg Explicit negotiations between government and opposition leaders to resolve disputes. 0.301
IntPres International pressure on competing political leaders or parties for reconciliation and fair play. 0.260
VioActs Guerrilla or terrorist acts by the opposition. 0.352
Factor 2
BigWin A free and fair election that produces a large majority in favor of one party. 0.297
StepDown Willingness of a government leader to step down (whether because of term limits, retirement or electoral defeat). 0.255
OppCont Evidence that the opposition will successfully contest for power. 0.253
NewPol New policy departures by a civilian regime where the military is strong and concerned. 0.269
Factor 3
ActOnOpp Concession or agreement by government leaders to accept or act on opposition demands.
0.330
NoAction Popular pressure by riots or demonstrations combined with an indecisive or inactive regime. 0.324
ConstStr Constitutional struggles in which groups contest key rules of the game, challenging or seeking to change the constitution. 
0.322
ContrlOpp Coercive acts by the regime to undermine or hinder the opposition from fairly contesting an election. 0.292
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Table 3: Three factor logistic regression.
Independent
Variable Odds Ratio Std. Err.
Factor 1 2.267 (0.92)*
Factor 2 0.519 (0.23)
Factor 3 2.701 (1.12)*
Note:  Entries  are  based  on  unstandardized
parameter  estimates  in  logistic  regression
equations  for  the  cases  in  our  sample.  Standard
errors are depicted in parentheses. * p < 0.05
Instead  of  using  violence,  the  opposition  could
pressure the regime through non-violent action [32].
The  international  community  could  decide  that
pressure alone is insufficient to thwart a political crisis
and  intervene  directly  in  the  election,  and  the
opposition  could  choose  constitutional  and  peaceful
means,  instead  of  violence,  to  protest  regime
repression. A number of potential pathways of political
conflict are illustrated in Appendix 3.
Factor 2: Elections and Policy (OppCont, BigWin,
StepDown, NewPol) demonstrates a pattern of events
and actions that  had  substantial  positive  effects  on
democratic  survival.  This  result  is  in  accord  with
expectations  since  it  reflects  an  environment  of
political competition in which both sides respect the
process  and  are  willing  to  accept  the  results  of
elections. That is,  the opponents are able to effect-
ively contend for power, one side scores a clear and
decisive victory in elections, and the losing party steps
down  from power  while  civilian  leaders  create  new
policies to diminish the military's role. 
This process occurred in Bulgaria during the 1996
presidential  election.  In  the run up to  the election,
polls indicated that the UDF opposition coalition can-
didate Peter Stoyanov had a good chance of winning
the presidential election. The election resulted in Stoy-
anov winning 59.9% of votes. Prime Minister (PM) and
ruling party leader Zhan Videnov agreed to step down
as both PM and party leader. In April, 1997, the UDF
won a decisive parliamentary election. During this period
there were no regime actions to control the opposition
or prevent them from fairly contesting the election.
The  case  of  Bulgaria  shows  that  while  partial
democratic regimes sometimes tip the scales in their
favor,  they may choose not  to overtly  suppress the
opposition.  Instead,  democratic  consolidation  is  ad-
vanced if the regime displays a willingness to compete
for political power within the political system. There
are  other  options  open  to  both  the  opposition  and
ruling  regime  along  the  way  that  would  set  the
country on a different course. For example, once the
ruling regime saw that the opposition was running a
strong campaign, they could decide to suppress them.
And  if  the  opposition  wins,  the  ruling  party  could
refuse  to  step  down,  resulting  in  the  failure  of
democracy  (see  Appendix  3).  Factor  2  shows  the
positive  power  of  this  cluster  of  cooperative  events
and actions to preserve democratic institutions.
Factor 3: Ruling Party Action (ActOnOpp, NoAc-
tion,  ConstStr,  ContrlOpp)  represents  the  opposite
pattern—a cluster of conflict-precipitating events and
actions—and had the largest impact on the odds of
democratic retreat. Factor 3 reflects an option-choice
framework. In this scenario the opposition is active,
and the regime considers them a threat. The regime
chooses from several  options—give  in  to  opposition
demands,  ignore  them,  or  suppress  the  opposition
using a change in the constitutional rules or force—
sometimes using all of these options in the lead-up to
an election. The presence of the latter three variables
in  the  factor  indicates  a  choice  to  deal  with  the
opposition by constraining them rather than engaging
with  the  opposition.  ContrlOpp and ConstStr  reflect
the suppression of new groups and changing of the
rules of the game to benefit the ruling coalition. Thus
the third factor runs the spectrum of responses from
conciliation,  to  ignoring,  to  actively  suppressing  the
opposition.
Albania seems to exemplify this pattern. In Albania
there  were  multiple  instances  in  which  the  regime
tampered  with  the  constitutional  and  legal  system.
These included dismissing the head of the Supreme
Court,  barring  officials  that  had  served  under  the
erstwhile Communist regime, and the passage of new
laws requiring screening of  public  officials'  activities
under the communist  regime. Among many political
arrests  and prosecutions,  the  ruling party  convicted
the leader of the Albanian Socialist Party on dubious
grounds and the police on numerous occasions broke
up  meetings  of  the  opposition  party  PSS.  Under
intense international pressure, an attempt was made
by the major parties to come to the negotiating table
and the ruling party did eventually agree to several of
the  opposition  demands.  Nonetheless,  Albania's
democracy still experienced a sharp retreat.
The  factor  analysis  does  not  provide  a  superior
model for forecasting democratic outcomes across the
entire data set. This is because these particular clusters
only  occur  in  some of  the  cases;  better  results  are
obtained  with  the  four  variable  logistic  regression
shown in Table 1, as these particular events are found
more commonly across the cases. However, the factor
analysis  does  show  that  certain  of  our  events  and
actions  do  tend  to  align  together  in  characteristic
patterns. 
The  pathways  to  these patterns  are  indicated  in
Appendix  3.  This  figure  shows  how many  'decision
points' we found where elites could choose cooperat-
ive or conflictual interactions. We do not rule out the
fact  that  once  a  democracy  becomes  consolidated
these choices become institutionalized or rule-bound,
so  that  in  established  democracies,  certain  choices
(e.g.  banning an opposition party or using extreme
military  force  against  political  opponents)  become
unthinkable,  and  cooperative  events  completely
dominate. Our analysis of the events around elections
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in emerging democracies, however, shows how often
both conflictual and cooperative events arose. Clearly,
a  theory  of  elite  interactions  that  involves  a  high
degree of elite choice, and outcomes that, in the near
term, depend on whether the preponderance of those
choices leans toward cooperation or conflict, best fits
the conditions in emerging, partial democracies.
5. Conclusions
This  paper  provides  significant  evidence  for  the
importance of elite interactions in the development of
democratic  stability  and  retreat.  An  analysis  of  the
total  numbers  of  events  across  two  groups  of
countries  with  different  outcomes  revealed  that  the
observed incidence of elite interactions and events in
a precipitating or cooperative direction in the months
around  national  elections  is  crucial  in  determining
those outcomes.
The logistic regression analysis bears out our hypo-
thesis that specific actions and events can predict, at
least for the short term, whether an election will lead
to  the  continuation  or  ending  of  progress  toward
democracy. The four variable model identified demo-
cratic  retreat  and  democratic  continuance  for  the
cases in this data set approximately 79% and 90% of
the  time,  respectively.  A  key  finding  is  that  we
generally do not see a simple pattern of all cooperat-
ive  events  and  actions  in  successes  vs.  all  conflict-
precipitating events and actions in failures. Rather, in
all  our  observed  emerging  democratic  countries  we
see  a  combination  of  cooperative  and  conflictual
events/actions  around elections;  what  differs  is  the
balance  and  specific  combinations  of  events  and
actions. A significantly higher incidence of precipitat-
ing  events,  such  as  violent  acts  by  the  opposition,
control  of  the  opposition  through  overt  repression,
and control of the opposition through manipulation of
the constitutional rules is indicative of a failure on the
part of the ruling coalition to keep up its commitments
toward withholding violence, maintaining stability and
sharing  political  and  economic  power  with  new
claimants. Conversely, a preponderance of cooperative
actions  indicates  a  willingness  to  keep  to  commit-
ments  to  "play  by  the  rules"  and  indicates  a  high
probability that democratic institutions will endure.
In cases of democratic retreat it is not just that the
total  number  of  conflict-precipitating  events  and
actions is higher than in cases of democratic survival;
rather, it is the  difference between that number and
the  number  of  cooperative  events that  is  most
significant. On average, there were 66% more precip-
itating than cooperative events in cases of democratic
retreat, whereas there were  11% fewer  precipitating
events  than  cooperative  events  in  cases  in  which
there was no retreat from democracy. The clustering
analysis revealed that there is a greater concentration
of precipitating events in cases of democratic retreat
than in cases in which a retreat did not take place.
However,  the  clustering  of  cooperative  events  was
similar across both groups of cases. This means that
in retreat cases there was, within a short time, a flurry
of concentrated conflict events that was not balanced
by a  similar  concentration  of  cooperative  events  to
counteract the damage to democracy.
It should be pointed out that it is the total balance
of events over a sustained period around an election
that matters. Observing several cooperative events in
the run-up to an election is hopeful, but not sufficient,
as a flurry of conflictual events may arise soon after
the election, derailing that progress. This appears to
have been the case in the recent elections in Egypt,
where cooperative events marked the months before
the  Presidential  election,  but  shortly  afterward
constitutional  struggles,  boycotts,  and  actions  to
control the opposition arose.
An  analysis  of  which  events  happened  most
frequently  provides  the  first  clues  in  understanding
democratic  retreat.  The  very  high  incidence  of  the
conflictual events control the opposition through overt
repression  (ContrlOpp)  and  political  acts  by  the
opposition  to  undermine  an  election  or  the  ruling
regime (OppActs) in the retreat cases indicates that
the opposition was fairly strong and that the govern-
ment  was  repressive.  This  conclusion  is  consistent
with the social movement literature on repression and
mobilization, which points to regime repression being
most severe in circumstances where the opposition is
well organized and possesses significant resources [33].
Conversely,  the  prevalence  of  the  cooperative
events  bringing the  opposition  into  the  government
(BringOpp) and a free and fair election that produces
a big win at the polls (BigWin) in the no retreat cases
indicates that it often takes explicit initiatives on the
part of regimes to follow democratic processes and to
allow the opposition a role in the political process to
ensure democratic outcomes. It should be noted that
not all countries in the no retreat group allowed free
and  fair  elections  to  take  place.  In  cases  like
Cameroon  and  Tunisia,  the  opposition  chose  to
boycott the elections and there were serious doubts
about the validity of the results. But elections did take
place and most importantly, the ruling party was able
to maintain power without  resorting to violent  sup-
pression  of  the  opposition  and the  opposition itself
was not very vocal or used less overt protest tactics.
Such cases may not be ideal in terms of democratic
practice,  but  they  avoided  the  coups,  cancelled
elections,  and  suppression  of  opposition  that  mark
major retreats or endings of democratic processes.
We also  wish  to  highlight  our  findings  regarding
international intervention. These clearly show that in-
ternational pressures cannot substitute for the willing-
ness  of  domestic  elites  to  engage  in  cooperative
actions or create cooperative events. We found that
both  international  engagement  variables  were  ob-
served more often in cases of democratic retreat. In
fact,  either international pressure to promote recon-
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ciliation  and  fair  play  (IntPres)  or  intervention  to
promote free and fair elections (Interv) occurred in 9
of the 14 cases of democratic retreat. Of the 10 cases
where IntPress was observed, 6 of the 10 ended in
democratic retreat. IntPres was also significant in the
factor analysis, where it occurred as part  the factor
leading to democratic retreat (Factor 1). 
While this may be a case of the international com-
munity  getting  involved  in  only  those  cases  where
there is extreme violence and thus the highest risk of
democratic retreat, it might also be that international
involvement has unintended consequences. One pos-
sibility  is  that  international  involvement  alters  the
factional power balance by pressuring the regime to
negotiate, and this emboldens the opposition by cre-
ating a political  opportunity  that  may lead  to more
overt and confrontational protest tactics and increased
mobilization.  The  message sent  by  international  in-
volvement  may be that  the regime cannot maintain
peace alone or that the international community dis-
approves  of  its  actions  toward  the  opposition.  The
opposition exploits this message, thereby "upping the
ante". International pressure then can do more harm
than good.
Where the regime is unable or unwilling to signal
its willingness to cooperate or compromise, interna-
tional involvement cannot make up for this absence.
International  pressures  thus  only  seem  likely  to
contribute  to  democratic  progress  where  the
international  actors  have  sufficient  leverage  to  get
the regime and opponents to engage in cooperative
actions  themselves,  such  as  direct  negotiations,
stepping down, and abiding by election results.
A final conclusion from this analysis is that it is a
worthwhile endeavor to further develop event-count
analysis to understand conflict trends (cf. [34]). The
fact  that  many  events  had  strong  and  significant
relationships with democratic retreat and that there
were  several  common  patterns  of  conflict  and
cooperation is  an encouraging sign in  the study of
event  patterns  as  antecedents  to  political  conflict
and democratic collapse.
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Appendix 1: Countries and time periods studied.
Group 1 (Retreat)
Country Time Period
Albania December 1994–December 1996
Angola March 1991–March 1993*
Armenia January 1994–January 1996
Bangladesh July 2005–August 2007
Belarus October 1993–October 1995
Burundi November 1991–December 1993*
Congo-Brazzaville January 1996–January 1998*
Guinea-Bissau January 2002–January 2004
Haiti January 1999–January 2001
Iran August 2002–August 2004
Ivory Coast January 2001–January 2003*
Nepal March 2001–April 2003*
Thailand October 2004–October 2006*
Zambia May 1995–May 1997
Group 2 (No Retreat)
Country Time Period
Benin September 2001–September 2003
Bulgaria April 1995–April 1997
Cameroon 1 September 1990–September 1992
Cameroon 2 November 1995–April 1998
Chad October 2000–October 2002
Comoros October 2000–October 2002
Djibouti June 1996–June 1998
East Timor December 2005–December 2007
El Salvador October 1997–October 1999
Equatorial Guinea August 1994–August 1996
Estonia September 1993–September 1995
Guatemala May 1998–May 2000
Guinea June 1992–June 1994
Greece March 1995–March 1997
Jordan January 2002 - January 2004
Laos August 2000–August 2002
Madagascar May 1995–May 1997
Mauritania 1 May 2002–May 2004
Mauritania 2 July 1990–July 1992
Moldova June 1995–June 1997
Mongolia November 2003–November 2005
Niger August 1991–August 1993
Papua New Guinea 1 February 2001–February 2003
Papua New Guinea 2 December 2005–December 2007
Poland May 1994–May 1996
Romania May 1995–May 1997
Solomon Islands October 2004–October 2006
Tanzania April 1994–April 1996
Tunisia April 2003–April 2005
*Civil war started, resumed, or intensified during this period
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Appendix 2: Full typology of elite interaction events.
Precipitating Events Abbreviation
Evidence that the opposition will successfully contest for power. OppContes
New policy departures by a civilian regime where the military is strong 
and concerned. NewPol
Popular pressure by riots or demonstrations combined with an 
indecisive or inactive regime. NoAction
Constitutional struggles in which groups clearly differ in their 
interpretation, or their efforts to change, basic rules that define access 
to power and how it is exercised.
ConstStr
Military actions against a guerrilla rebellion, peaceful protest, opposition 
party or activists, where the actions are extreme and clearly violate 
democratic and human rights norms.
MilExt
Military threats or actions against the government. MilThreat
A victory by a political party whose policy platform is viewed as 
threatening to ruling elite interests. RefVic
Coercive acts by the regime to undermine or hinder the opposition from 
fairly contesting an election. ContrlOpp
Political acts by the opposition to undermine elections or the ruling 
regime. OppActs
Acts by other nations that affect the regime or opposition in terms of 
their resources or capabilities for political actions. IntActs
Guerrilla or terrorist acts by the opposition. VioActs
Cooperative Events Abbreviation
Bringing opposition political leaders into the cabinet or executive 
position or leading roles in the legislature. BringOpp
Agreement by the government or opposition to accept defeat in a free 
and fair election. AccptDef
A free and fair election that produces a large majority in favor of one 
party. BigWin
Popular support or acceptance for measures by the government to deal 
with an unruly opposition. PopSupp
Concession or agreement by government leaders to accept or act on 
opposition demands. ActOnOpp
Explicit negotiations between government and opposition leaders to 
resolve disputes. ExplNeg
International intervention to promote free and fair elections. Interv
Willingness of a government leader to step down (whether because of 
term limits, retirement, or electoral defeat). StepDown
The natural or accidental death of government or opposition leaders 
who were especially fractious or polarizing. LedDeath
International pressure on competing political leaders or parties for 
reconciliation and fair play. IntPres
Government lifts ban on some type of political activity. LiftBan
Government, dominant party or leader publicly accepts a court ruling 
that weakens their political position. AccRulg
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Appendix 3: Flowchart of intra-elite maneuvering.
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